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REVERSE MONITORING:
ON THE HIDDEN ROLE OF EMPLOYEE
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION
Sharon Hannes*
This Article develops a new understanding of equity-based compen-
sation schemes, such as employee stock option plans. Current
literature views such schemes as a measure aimed at motivating the
recipient employees to work harder for the firm. Under that view,
this method of remuneration either complements or substitutes for
other measures used to monitor the performance of the recipient
employees. In contrast, this Article proposes that recipient employ-
ees be viewed as potential monitors of other employees and that
stock options (or similar types of compensation) motivate them to
fulfill this task. This view has many applications and can shed light
on persistent puzzles, including why there is sweeping use of stock
ownership plans by many "new economy"firms. No junior employee
at Microsoft or Intel can improve the value of her heavyweight em-
ployer to such a degree that it will make it worthwhile for her to work
harder once stock options are offered. Nevertheless, given the sensi-
tivity of the "knowledge industry" to leakage of its intellectual
property, all employees can add much to the company's value by
standing on guard against such loss. If technology is both a vulner-
able and critical asset for the organization, option recipients will be
alert in protecting against infringement. Since not much effort
needs to be exerted to monitor their peers and supervisors to pre-
vent this significant harm, incentive compensations can easily
motivate employees to perform their monitoring task. Many other
applications of this new view that cannot be explained by the cur-
rent literature are discussed in the Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The literature explains that broad-based employee stock option plans, as
well as other types of stock-based compensation, are designed primarily to
motivate employees to exert greater effort. This Article questions this tradi-
tional and widely accepted view and supplements it with another
justification for such a type of compensation. Stock options "privatize" the
firm's monitoring task into the hands of its employees. Each employee
equipped with stock-based compensation is motivated to monitor other em-
ployees-including that employee's supervisor-to make sure her peers do
not harm the firm and that they do their best to maximize its value. This
view of options turns the traditional understanding on its head. Instead of
emphasizing the role of options in alleviating the burden of monitoring re-
cipient employees, the proposed view, which I term "reverse monitoring,"
underlines the role of those employees as monitors of other employees.'
This view may shed light on several puzzles that the traditional literature
does not answer in a satisfactory manner. For one, it may explain why many
1. In agency theory terms, and as shall be further discussed, this means that the costs asso-
ciated with option grants to employees are monitoring costs and not bonding costs. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
2. Elsewhere I have discussed another untraditional role of incentive pay in a different
context. See Sharon Hannes, A Demand-Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
475, 494-95 (2006) (discussing the role of executive pay in the context of takeovers).
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"new economy" firms grant across-the-board stock-based compensation.
The traditional account explains that efforts of employees in this industry
sector are especially valuable but hardly measurable. It is doubtful, however,
whether the contribution of the ordinary engineer at Microsoft has enough
of an effect on the value of Microsoft stock for this argument to hold. In
contrast, the reverse monitoring argument explains that Microsoft stock
may, indeed, suffer salient damages if its employees tamper with or transfer
its highly valuable source code or other proprietary intellectual property.
Stock-based compensation provides a powerful incentive for the recipients
to monitor their fellow employees against such behavior. And these employ-
ees have the ability to fulfill this monitoring task much more efficiently than
any other, outside agent. In some cases, this view justifies granting options
to many employees, not only to highly creative ones or those at the top of
the pyramid. From this perspective, Intel's longstanding policy of granting
options to all employees is understandable and far from na've. Simply put,
in many high-tech firms, option grants are one of many measures for pre-
venting intellectual property leakage or sabotage.
One recent study clearly presents the challenge that broad-based em-
ployee option plans pose for the traditional literature:
However, many firms also offer firm-wide stock options and profit sharing
plans that provide even less incentive than executive plans-after all, most
workers can expect to reap a very minimal amount of personal gain from
their contribution to firm value or profits. Given the free-rider problems as-
sociated with group compensation plans, their prevalence is puzzling.5
This description accurately reiterates and questions the commonly held
rationale for option grants. Although every employee with stock options is
expected to exert more effort at work due to the options, why would anyone
cause herself discomfort based on the remote possibility that her modified
behavior will substantially alter the value of the option grant? The picture
changes dramatically if we instead view the recipient employee as a monitor
herself and not as a target of monitoring by means of the option. No sub-
stantial effort is required of employees to monitor their peers, as their
3. A "new economy" firm is usually defined as a firm from one of the following market
sectors: computers, semiconductors, telephone equipment, or Intemet-related industries. See, e.g.,
Christopher D. Ittner et al., The structure and performance of equity grants to employees of new
economy firms, 34 J. ACT. & ECON. 89 (2003).
4. Intel's describes its program as follows:
At Intel, our employees own a stake in the company. Through Intel's Stock Option Plan, full
and part-time employees may be eligible to receive options based on their past performance
and anticipated future contributions. Additionally, all employees are encouraged to enroll in
the Stock Participation Plan, a program that offers employees an opportunity to purchase Intel
stock at a price lower than the fair market value through convenient payroll deductions.
See Jobs at Intel-The Workplace, Employee Benefits and Development, http://www.intel.com/jobs/
workplace/benefits.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
5. Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? 1 (July 2000)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstractid=237917 (emphasis
added).
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working interactions allow them easily to observe their fellow employees. In
contrast to the literature's paradigm of options overcoming recipients' natu-
ral resistance to exerting greater effort, peer monitoring is almost costless
and requires only awareness. It is therefore hardly surprising that most new
economy firms arrange the working environment in an open floor plan, as
open spaces and option grants are complementary measures. Even if em-
ployees handle especially valuable and sensitive information, the employer
has no need for sophisticated surveillance techniques, since the employees,
armed with options, are always watching their peers on the firm's behalf. It
is hard to imagine anyone in a better position to fulfill this mission, and be-
cause their explicit duties do not include this task, it is wise to give them an
incentive to do so in the form of options. Ironically, options cause employ-
ees in these firms to work harder, not because (as is commonly thought)
they consider themselves owners, but because their peers are watching and
they care.
Moreover, in many new economy firms, almost any employee can cause
considerable damage to the firm by way of breach of trust or otherwise tam-
pering with the firm's intellectual property. This harmful potential is usually
much more significant than any beneficial potential that one employee
bears, as one rotten employee can spoil the achievements of many others.
This reality underscores the use of options as a monitoring device. If a mali-
cious or untrustworthy employee wishes to harm the firm, it is unlikely her
option grant will cause her to reconsider. The value of the option grants of
her peer employees, however, could drop substantially if she were to carry
out such a scheme. This causes her peers to be alert to the possibility of such
an occurrence. When an employee becomes cause for concern, other em-
ployees (including those usually supervised by her) will quickly report her
to eliminate the danger she poses. Altogether, the proposed view of option
grants tilts both sides of the classic equation. On the one hand, employees
need exert almost no effort in monitoring their peers, especially if the work-
ing environment is arranged transparently. On the other hand, peer
monitoring can prevent much damage to and leakage of valuable informa-
tion to competitors. Thus, a medium-sized option package that cannot
motivate an employee to work harder can easily motivate her to monitor. As
we shall see below, recent empirical studies that refute the classic view of
option grants as an incentive device correspond perfectly with the argument
presented in this Article.
The reverse monitoring theory has additional important applications that
deserve further attention and will not be developed at length in this Article.
First, the proposed approach explains why stock-based compensation is jus-
tified for key officers in concentrated-ownership enterprises. Resembling the
argument above, it is doubtful that these grants are the optimal manner to
motivate these officers to exert greater effort. After all, in a concentrated-
ownership firm, in contrast to a diffused-ownership firm, the entity has a
controller who can reward or sanction the executive officers directly, with-
out need for the crude measure of options. The reverse monitoring theory
suggests an alternative explanation. Equipped with options, key officers
1424 [Vol. 105:1421
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guard against expropriation by the controlling shareholder of the entity, al-
though they must do so in a covert manner so as to prevent the controller's
revenge. Concentrated-ownership firms with this type of compensation
structure should be able to win the trust of institutional investors more eas-
ily. Given such a compensation scheme to her officers, the controller is more
likely to pursue the interests of all shareholders, rather than her own agenda.
This explanation sheds light on why equity-based compensation is on the
rise outside U.S. borders, where firm ownership is commonly concentrated
(and self-dealing by the controller is a major issue), as well as in U.S. firms
with controlling shareholders
A second important application relates to gatekeepers. Equity-based
compensation for gatekeepers is an attractive measure from the reverse
monitoring perspective. However, such measures can be tricky. While on the
one hand, it will motivate gatekeepers to monitor some of management's
actions (such as with regard to self-dealing transactions), it may on the other
hand, also exacerbate other problems (such as accounting fraud). Some
checks and balances are therefore necessary if equity-based compensation is
to effectively reward gatekeepers.6 To these two important applications of
the reverse monitoring approach and a few others I will return in Part IV
before concluding the discussion.
The Article progresses as follows. Part I starts out by discussing the
proliferation of executive and broad-based stock option plans (and other
equity-based compensation) in the United States. Thereafter, the Part
briefly describes the main criticism against the current trends in executive
compensation and shows that it does not hold for broad-based stock option
plans. Part II discusses the non-incentive based justifications given in the
literature for this trend and the reasons why these explanations are ques-
tionable. Part III presents the idea of reverse monitoring and how this
approach can shed light on recent empirical findings that challenge the
classic incentive-based view of equity-based compensation. Part IV sug-
gests expanding the discussion to equity-based compensation for
executives in public firms with a controlling shareholder, to gatekeepers,
to employees in partially privatized firms, and to employees of pre-IPO
ventures. The Conclusion wraps up the discussion and relates it to the lit-
erature about U.S. executive compensation.
I. THE PROLIFERATION OF EXECUTIVE AND BROAD-BASED
ESOPs IN THE UNITED STATES
Most of the literature on employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs") fo-
cuses on executive compensation.7 Given the extraordinary features of these
6. For a recent discussion of rewards to gatekeepers, see Assaf Hamdani & Reinier
Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
7. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Kevin F. Hallock & Kevin J.
Murphy eds., 1999) (reporting a surge in the number of papers that discuss executive compensation
in the 1990s).
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plans (and perhaps also the high profiles of the executives involved), this is
hardly surprising. Much has changed since Jensen and Murphy first made
their famous claim in 1990 that American CEOs are "paid like bureaucrats,"8
and in the last fifteen years the total compensation of top executives has
more than tripled.9
This dramatic rise in executive compensation was due at least in part to
the striking increase in option grants. While in 1985 the value of options
granted was only 8% of the average CEO's total compensation,'0 from 1992
to 1998 the options' value rose from 25% to 40%," peaking in 2000 at 51%
of average total compensation. 2 Moreover, while in 1980 only 57% of top
executives owned options in their firm, this number had risen to 87% by
1994;'" in 1999 alone 94% of the largest companies granted options to their
top executives.
4
However, and notwithstanding the high-profile discussion on managerial
pay, equity-based compensation is certainly not a phenomenon unique to top
executives. The lion's share of equity-based compensation goes to mid-level
employees. In a random sample of 1000 firms that filed proxy statements
with the SEC in 1999, 48.9% had adopted broad-based stock option plans in
1998. 15 Among those firms making broad use of stock-based compensation
8. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARV. Bus. REV. May-June 1990, at 138, 138 (reviewing U.S. executive compensation in
the period of 1969 to 1983); cf Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. EcON. 653, 655 (1998) (reviewing compensation practices of the 400 largest
public firms and concluding that executives are no longer paid like bureaucrats and that pay is linked
to performance).
9. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. EON. PERSP.
49 (2003) (reporting and discussing executive option grants).
10. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 64 (1992) (presenting results of an empirical study among 800 pub-
lic firms).
11. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,
90 AM. EON. REV. 209, 209 (2000); see Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the
1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 131
(2000); see also Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 713, 719 (1995) (reviewing executive compensation practices among 1000 large public firms
and observing that options accounted for 23% of executive total compensation, averaging $1.3 mil-
lion for each of the five most highly paid executives).
12. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 847, 848 (2002) (discussing growth in execu-
tive compensation).
13. Hall & Liebman, supra note 8, at 663.
14. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock options for undiversified executives, 33 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 3, 4 (2002) (reviewing executive compensation in the largest 500 U.S. firms); see also
Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1869, 1888 (2001) (reporting that 94% of a sample of 250 large public firms used stock option com-
pensation, in 1996, in a sample of 250 large public firms, 90% of the companies used stock option
compensation).
15. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?
An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories 6-9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10222, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10222. An ESOP was defined for
the purposes of the study as broad-based if it granted all employees, excluding the 10% most highly
1426 [Vol. 105:1421
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beyond the executive tier, the new economy firms from industries based on
knowledge are highly overrepresented. Whereas these firms represent only
16.2% of the entire sample in number, they account for 26.2% of the sample
firms with broad-based plans and only 6.6% of firms that grant options
mainly to their executives. These significant findings-that many firms issue
options to many employees and that new economy firms do so more than
other firms-present a challenge to the existing literature, but are easily rec-
oncilable with the reverse monitoring argument. Before we progress to this
explanation and the fact that additional empirical findings seem to corrobo-
rate it, a few words are in order about the current criticism of stock options
for top executives. The point here is twofold. First, as we shall see, most
criticism about executive compensation arrangements stems from the power
and tendency of executives to tilt the design of their compensation in their
own favor. This criticism is irrelevant to compensation schemes of lower
level employees, since they certainly lack such power. Second, even the
harshest critics of current executive compensation structures do not argue
against the principle of using ESOPs, which are the compensation schemes
advocated in this Article.
In a recent book, which has received much attention in the media and in
academia, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue that executive compensa-
tion in the United States is structured for the benefit of managers and is
inimical to shareholders.16 If this criticism is justified and it extends to
broad-based ESOPs as well, then this Article's quest to uncover the benefits
of ESOPs to employers may well be moot. Upon brief scrutiny, however,
this line of criticism is revealed to be irrelevant to our discussion. Bebchuk
and Fried argue, in short, that top executives, especially CEOs, have consid-
erable power to intervene in setting compensation, which leads to less-than-
optimal contracting results. The result is too much pay without enough sen-
sitivity to firm performance, accompanied by many inefficient arrangements
that provide unnoticed "stealth" compensation to managers. The use of op-
tions and similar compensation arrangements, goes the argument, does not
really serve the purpose of motivating managers, but is an excuse to pay
them more.
On its face, this line of criticism does not apply to broad-based ESOPs.
Mid-level employees have no special power in setting their own compensa-
tion, and firms have no incentive to compensate inefficiently. If the pay
structure for these employees is inefficient, both the firm and employees can
do better by improving that pay structure. And since option grants that fluc-
tuate in value impose considerable risk on the recipient employees, there
paid employees, at least 1% of the firm's outstanding share capital in one year. Because detailed
information in securities disclosures is available only for the five highest-paid workers, the above
calculation entails certain assumptions. Id. at 7.
16. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (criticizing manager pay practices and offering
reform proposal). But see John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance? 103 MICH. L. REV. 1442 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra) (arguing
against Bebchuk and Fried's major points and proposals).
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must be compelling justification to use them; otherwise firms could use
conventional pay, which would allow them both to pay less and to impose
less risk on the workers, leaving both parties better off. Moreover, accepting
Bebchuk and Fried's criticism of the current structure of executive pay does
not require the conclusion that equity-based compensation is an undesirable
measure. In fact, this measure, when structured correctly, is highly recom-
mended by the authors:
The managerial power approach does not question the desirability of using
options to compensate executives. Options provide managers with greater
incentive to create shareholder value, and thus the use of options in execu-
tive compensation might well be beneficial to shareholders. Rather, the
managerial power approach focuses on whether the magnitude and design
of a particular option-based pay package [are] close to that which would
arise under optimal contracting.
7
The conclusion of this discussion therefore allows us to continue to analyze
the concept of broad-based ESOPs without being affected by the recent
criticism of executive ESOPs."S
II. NON-INCENTIVE-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
ADOPTION OF ESOPs ON A BROAD BASIS
We saw above that the criticism directed at executive option plans is not
applicable to option plans for ordinary employees. Moreover, the empirical
literature reveals that the outcomes of such broad-based ESOP adoption are
highly favorable to shareholders of the adopting firms. Firms that broadly
disperse stock options to employees enjoy better economic performance, in
various measures, than their non-granting peer firms. 9 Further analysis
shows that option grants bear a statistically significant positive influence on
the market value of option-adopting firms. 20 What benefits, then, do broad-
based ESOPs produce to counter the costs of the expensive measure? While
the most common answer is that ESOPs overcome employees' free-riding
and give them an incentive to exert additional efforts at work, this Article
argues that this incentive is not likely to emerge in practice and that the an-
swer to the question therefore lies in another type of incentive that stock
options generate. But before discussing the flaws of the common incentive-
based argument and my proposed alternative, this Part of the paper will
17. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 792 (2002) (emphasis added).
18. The discussion should, however, affect the academic discourse regarding executive pay, a
point to which I return in the Conclusion.
19. See, e.g., Inner et al., supra note 3 (measuring success of ESOPs against firms' stated
objectives); James C. Sesil et al., Broad-based Employee Stock Options in U.S. 'New Economy'
Firms, 40 BIT. J. INDUS. REL. 273 (2002) (measuring differences in financial outcomes for firms
with and without broad-based ESOPs).
20. Timothy B. Bell et a]., The Valuation Implications of Employee Stock Option Accounting
for Profitable Computer Software Firms, 77 AcCT. REV. 971 (2002).
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consider other non-incentive-based justifications for stock option plans. I
briefly present each justification and discuss certain reservations that can be
raised with regard to these justifications, although this Article's argument
can in fact complement each of the justifications.
A. Retention
A commonly-echoed argument in the literature is that options are
"golden handcuffs," helping firms preserve their workforce and prevent at-
trition. Options undoubtedly do have this quality, as they usually vest
gradually, normally along a four-year period, which makes it worthwhile for
workers to maintain their positions at the firm. However, this argument does
not explain the superiority of options over other forms of long-term com-
pensation. Option grants involve risks, including factors beyond the firm's
boundaries and control; thus, if retention is the firm's only concern, a fixed
long-term bonus plan (or one that is tied to individual employee perform-
ance) seems more suitable. The prevalent retention argument, therefore,
does not explain why option grants, as a specific type of deferred compensa-
tion, are the best-suited tool for employee retention.
There is a more sophisticated version of the employee retention argu-
ment, however. Stock prices in an industry and its labor market conditions
are often correlated. When stock prices soar in an industry, employers are
typically short of workers, and vice versa. Long-term option grants auto-
matically index employees' deferred compensation value to their outside
employment opportunities. Costly negotiations and adjustments of contracts
are therefore saved by the fact that the inflated value of the option grant pre-
vents attrition when conditions for employees improve in the market.
Interestingly, this sophisticated version of the employee-retention justifica-
tion has some empirical backing. The authors of one study showed that
fluctuations in salaries in certain markets are accompanied by correlating
fluctuations in the value of mid-sized option grants in the same markets,
21thus saving the burden and cost of adjusting wages.
While I have no doubt that a compensation package containing options
assists in employee retention, I think that to argue that this is the objective
of granting options is to miss the point. Although the value of options is in-
fluenced by macroeconomics and industry-wide factors, a distinct feature of
options is that they primarily reflect the performance of the issuing firm. If
the main concern of employers were indexing compensation to outside em-
ployment opportunities, salaries could be indexed to industry-level
indicators. Therefore, for a full picture of the rationale for the extensive use
of options in the market, a theory directly connecting the employee and the
issuer-employer is necessary.
21. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 15, at 28-32.
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B. Financing Constraints
Another common and extensively-examined explanation for the use of
ESOPs maintains that cash-constrained firms offer stock as compensation in
lieu of raising funds in a more traditional fashion. While this argument is
intuitively very compelling, it has limited empirical backing. One study
seeking empirical support for this argument looked for a link between ESOP
usage and a few different measures of financial constraint. The study re-
vealed that firms that grant options have more accumulated losses, but it
could not find any correlation between option grants and other measures,
such as dividend payouts.22 Other studies showed findings that were even
less favorable to the financial constraints explanation. One study looked for
a link between ESOP usage and cash-flows per employee or available-cash-
per-employee as measures of financial constraints in new economy firms
and concluded that there is "no evidence that cash constrained new economy
firms make greater use of equity-based compensation. 23 This finding is es-
pecially problematic for the financial-constraints argument since the
intuition is that many new economy start-ups issue ESOPs in lieu of paying
salaries because they are cash constrained. Finally, in relation to non-
executive grants, which are especially interesting for the reverse monitoring
argument, one study found that they are positively related to high cash levels
and unrelated to several factors of cash constraints and financial distress.
This study concluded that "[t]hese findings cast doubt on the hypotheses
that option grants are motivated by asymmetric information and cash con-
straints. 24
But putting aside empirical findings, it is common knowledge that
heavyweight new economy firms such as Intel, Microsoft, IBM, Dell, and
many others use stock-based compensation extensively. Therefore, even if
there is much appeal and sense to the financial constraints justification, it
surely does not tell the entire story of employee stock options.
C. Sorting
The next explanation for broad-based employee stock ownership plans is
the sorting argument, namely, that firms are able to sort out the most suit-
able employees by means of incentive pay packages. Traditional sorting
arguments suggest that firms offer incentive packages to attract the employ-
25
ees who can best contribute to firm value. In its simple form, however, this
22. Simi Kedia & Abon Mozumdar, Performance Impact of Employee Stock Options (Jan.
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id=304188.
23. Ittner et al., supra note 3, at 108.
24. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation 7
(MIT Sloan Research, Working Paper No. 4504-04, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
abstractid=587426.
25. See Edward P. Lazear, Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting? (Inst. for the
Study of Labor, Working Paper No. 761, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.con/abstract=403900
(positing a model in which firms cannot distinguish between the types of work applicants and there-
1430 [Vol. 105:1421
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type of argument assumes that a single employee can improve the firm mar-
ket value to such a degree that it is even worthwhile to design a
compensation scheme that involves so much uncertainty from the point of
view of the employee (and therefore so much expense to the employer who
26has to compensate the employee for the risk). Since the validity of this as-
sumption is questionable, as I will elaborate in my discussion of incentives
considerations, researchers have formulated and tested more nuanced sort-
ing arguments.27
Under the more sophisticated models of sorting, employees are hetero-
geneous in their beliefs regarding the firm's prospects. Hence, the
corporation will attract the most optimistic employees by offering stock
compensation. The firm can benefit from this practice because it enables the
firm to reduce its overall compensation expenses. If "optimistic" employees
value the firm's stock options above the market price, then firms may pay
less by offering them stock, as opposed to traditional pay packages. This
argument does not depend on the assumption that each sorted employee be-
lieves that she alone can significantly drive up the market value of the firm's
shares. Rather, it is necessary only for some employees to believe in the
specific prospects of the employer beyond the general belief prevalent in the
marketplace. Moreover, if we make the additional assumption that the most
optimistic employees are also the most suitable employees, given their be-
lief in the future of the firm, then additional benefits to the firm ensue from
hiring able employees. Thus, stock-based compensation, under this sorting
argument, enables firms to attract employees who are highly enthusiastic
about the firm's future by offering them a pay package that falls below its
cash equivalent on the stock market.
The researchers who formulated this argument tested its plausibility
against current statistics. The main problem with this argument is the high
risk costs associated with stock-based compensation. Risk-averse employees
discount the value of their pay package due to the volatility of share prices
on the stock exchange, which may outweigh the benefits mentioned above.
After assessing the possible effects and running a computerized simulation,
the authors tried to match the sorting argument with the existing data and
concluded as follows:
Our calculations here indicate that, holding the employee's risk aversion
constant, firms with lower stock volatility can more efficiently use stock
options. Firms in the NCEO sample tend, however, to have very high vola-
tilities. The fact that high-volatility firms use options is consistent with
sorting only if these firms hire a selection of very risk tolerant employees,
fore attract employees who can contribute the most by tying the offered pay to the employee's per-
formance).
26. The risk stems from the volatility of the share prices on the stock exchange, which for a
risk-averse employee can easily outweigh any sorting benefit asserted under the traditional argument
discussed in the text.
27. See, e.g., Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 15, at 11-12, 24-28.
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if the firm can locate extremely optimistic employees, or if optimistic em-
ployees are significantly more productive. 8
As expressed in the above passage, the finding that the most volatile
firms are those that use stock-based compensation does leave some room for
the sorting hypothesis, but it also requires adding highly restrictive assump-
tions. At the very least, these qualifications raise doubts whether firms can
afford to design compensation schemes that are effective only for highly
optimistic and risk-tolerant employees. Moreover, the authors did not ex-
plain why less volatile firms that could utilize the same compensation
scheme efficiently do not use it as often. Most importantly, and on the theo-
retical level, attracting optimistic employees by granting them overvalued
shares seems, to me, to be an adverse practice. Although some compensa-
tion costs are minimized at the time of the options grant, the firm will have
to cope with its highly disappointed employees when the stock options vest
and the employees eventually realize their rash optimism. Because a firm
must maintain a good relationship with its workforce over time, I doubt the
wisdom of attracting employees by taking advantage of their optimism.
Hence, even if firms could underpay by using subjectively overvalued eq-
uity, it does not follow that this practice is desirable. It is also unproven that
the objective value of stock or an options grant to employees falls short of
its cash equivalent. Thus, if stock ownership plans sort optimistic employees
and thus economize on some compensation costs, it seems to me that this is
a by-product of these remuneration measures and not their main aim or con-
sequence.
D. Accounting Considerations
Until recently, employee stock option plans received favorable account-
ing treatment. Firms could generally elect not to recognize pay in stock
options as an expense, although the value of the stock option grant had to be
disclosed to the public.29 Thus, firms were able to boost their profits by us-
ing options instead of plain-vanilla salaries. However, if the stock market
considers the entire disclosure and not only the financial statements, share
prices should not be affected by the artificially inflated profits. Interestingly,
there are some empirical findings that "call[] into question whether investors
correctly assess the effect of employee stock options on ... firms' value,"0
and at the very least, it is unclear precisely how stock prices incorporate
option grant information." Hence, if investors can be tricked to some extent
28. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
29. Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 53 ("[T]here is usually no accounting expense recorded
for options either at time of grant or exercise.").
30. Bell et al., supra note 20, at 974.
31. For empirical assessments of options' value disclosure on market prices, see David
Aboody, Market valuation of employee stock options, 22 J. ACCT. & EcON. 357 (1996); David
Aboody et al., SFAS No. 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Values, 79
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by evading recognition of the expense of stock options, the accounting
treatment may be a cause of the expansion in stock-option pay. Moreover,
this favorable accounting treatment might be a contributing factor in the
stock-option trend even if managers naively believe that the market can be
fooled or if their own pay is linked to the firm's accounting performance and
not to the market value of the shares. Finally, note that, prior to December
2004, accounting standards required firms to write option grants as an ex-
pense if the strike price of the option was below the price of the underlying
share of the firm on the stock exchange at the date of the option grant. Nev-
ertheless, for a long period many firms were able to illegally circumvent this
requirement by retroactively reporting as if they granted options on a date
when the price of the share was extremely low-a practice notoriously
known as "backdating." This illegal maneuver, constituting securities fraud,
seemingly enhanced the favorable accounting treatment of ESOPS .3
However, it is doubtful whether favorable accounting treatment can ex-
plain the prevalence of stock-based compensation. Given that employees
tend to be risk-averse, compensating them with stock-based pay, the value of
which depends on the uncertain movement of the market, is a very expen-
sive measure.33 If the entire maneuver is aimed at artificially inflating profits
and camouflaging expenses, then firms with solid corporate governance
would avoid paying more in options to compensate for the risk involved
from the employees' perspective. However, empirical research reveals that
corporate governance is not weaker among option-friendly firms than
ACCT. REV. 251 (2004); and Mark R. Huson et al., Earnings Dilution and the Explanatory Power of
Earnings for Returns, 76 J. ACCT. & EcON. 589 (2001).
32. This practice was revealed by an empirical study documenting that stock returns were
abnormally negative before executive option grants and abnormally positive after the grants were
made. These return patterns almost vanished after August 29, 2002, when the SEC requirement that
option grants must be reported within two business days took effect. See Randall A. Heron & Erik
Lie, Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?, J. FIN.
ECON. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.conabstract=877889; see also Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein, and Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper
No. 566) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=945392 (providing an empirical examination of
backdating of CEOs' options and their relations to corporate governance factors). The empirical
findings created an almost unprecedented scandal. See, e.g., David 1. Walker, Some Observations on
the Stock Option Backdating Scandal of 2006 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-31,
2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstractid=929702 (reporting that the SEC is investigat-
ing more than seventy-five companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options
granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and that the number of firms
caught up in the scandal seems to increase daily); M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani, & H. Nejat
Seyhan, The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. (forth-
coming June 2007) (finding that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to
shareholders of about seven percent).
33. The huge risk-related costs of stock-based compensation were stressed in the literature:
Companies paying options in lieu of cash are effectively borrowing from employees, receiving
employment services today in return for highly variable (and often nonexistent) payouts in the
future. But risk-averse undiversified employees are unlikely to be efficient sources of capital,
especially compared to banks, private equity funds, venture capitalists and other investors who
specialize in managing risk and providing capital.
Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 56. Note, however, that Hall and Murphy did not account for the
illegal practice of backdating, which reduces employees' risk to some extent.
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among option-averse firms.34 This finding calls into doubt the favorable ac-
counting treatment argument. Along the same lines, many firms that use
broad-based option plans, such as Microsoft and Oracle, are managed by
founders with large equity stakes, and they are unlikely to harm firm value
in exchange for an artificial increase in profits.35
Moreover, by early 2003, more than 155 companies that use stock-based
compensation had voluntarily begun to include options as an expense, thus
forgoing the favorable accounting treatment. 36 Most importantly, new finan-
cial accounting standards mandate recognizing option-based pay as an
expense.37 And even before that, new SEC regulations requiring immediate
reporting of executive ESOPs eliminated backdating. 3s The favorable ac-
counting treatment is now history. If this accounting treatment did play a
role in the emergence of the stock-option trend, it can no longer justify its
existence, and although firms are reconsidering the use of stock-based com-
pensation there is no sign that this phenomenon is close to disappearing.
E. Morale, Teamwork, and Norms
The next possible explanation for the popularity of broad-based em-
ployee stock ownership plans focuses on the effect that this type of
compensation has on the norms and morale of the firm workforce. Under
this argument, stock or stock-option grants change the status of the em-
ployee from an ordinary worker to an owner and transform the firm's
workforce into a community. Once workers become owners, they develop
social norms that entail cooperation with other members of their community
and devotion of as much effort as possible to the community's prosperity.
This may also explain why all workers should be rewarded, although not
necessarily to the same extent, so that no one feels left out of the commu-
nity. In fact, this ideal is the same model often manifested by the employers
themselves. In the words of Microsoft CEO Steve Balmer, "[o]ur compensa-
tion philosophy is simple .... We want to attract and retain employees by
offering real ownership and great long-term financial incentives."'3 9
34. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. EcoN. 107
(empirically comparing corporate governance strength at certain types of firms).
35. See Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 15, at 16 (raising the examples of Oracle and
Microsoft).
36. David Aboody et al., Firms' Voluntary Recognition of Stock-Based Compensation Ex-
pense, 42 J. AccT. RES. 123, 124 (2004) (discussing voluntary firm decisions to recognize option
compensation as an expense); Catherine Schrand, Discussion of Firms' Voluntary Recognition of
Stock-Based Compensation Expense, 42 J. ACCT. REs. 151, 151-53 (2004) (same).
37. This new financial account standard was effective as of December 2004. Share-Based
Payment, Statement of Fin. Accouting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).
38. The new SEC regulation became effective in August 2002. It took another four years to
reveal the extent of backdating that took place before 2002. In any case, all recent scandals relate to
the period of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Walker, supra note 32, at 2, 8.
39. Microsoft Reshapes Compensation for Continued Success, http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/press/2003/JuO3/07-08CompPR.mspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2006) (emphasis added).
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The phrase "real ownership" conceals the fact that the fraction of owner-
ship granted to the individual employee is minute. But, just as people do not
calculate their fraction of ownership in their household or in their narrow
community, employees are expected to do their utmost for their corporation
once options are introduced even if their financial benefit from this behavior
is miniscule. The norms generated by the stock-option compensation meas-
ure are thus supposed to overcome the firm's necessity to monitor the
recipient employees.
While I doubt how much water this argument holds, I will nonetheless
detail another impact stock-based compensation has on social norms and
human behavior that has evaded the literature. Namely, stock-based com-
pensation has an interesting role in inducing employees to monitor their
peers from the aspect of social norms and irrational behavior. This stands in
contradiction to the traditional view that stresses the role of such compensa-
tion in inducing investment of effort and maintaining cooperation. To
appreciate my monitoring argument, it is necessary first to understand that
in the absence of stock-based compensation, the work environment is
40tainted by certain cognitive biases identified by behavioral economy and
by certain flaws identified by organizational psychology. So as not to stray
from the scope of this Article, I will only briefly sketch a few of these biases
and flaws and will then explain how stock-based compensation assists the
corporation in partially overcoming the challenges that stem from them.
The first phenomenon, documented in a seminal experiment by Asch,
is conformism.4' Simply put, people tend to heed the consensus and put
aside their own beliefs, moral opinions, and even good judgment. Con-
formism can be dangerous if a firm's workforce adopts detrimental
attittudes such as treating customers poorly or stealing from the employer.
A second, well-documented phenomenon in organizational psychology is
workers' obedience to what they perceive to be a legitimate authority
within the organization. The potential harm in such a tendency lies in the
fact that employees rarely try to contradict their supervisors, even if a su-
pervisor's behavior harms the firm or its shareholders. Third, as
experiments in behavioral economics have shown, people are often irra-
tional in that they have a so-called self-protective or self-serving bias. 2
40. The field of behavioral economy, which is an interdisciplinary mix of psychology and
economics, was pioneered by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. See generally Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at
1124; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341
(1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in
RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (Robin M. Hogarth
& Melvin W. Reder eds., Chi. Univ. Press 1987).
41. STEPHEN P. ROBBINS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: CONCEPTS, CONTROVERSIES, AND
APPLICATIONS 257-58 (1998) (describing Asch's famous experiment in which people followed the
errors of their group members in regard to easily identified objective matter).
42. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 649 (1999) (describing an experiment in which
students who were designated as either plaintiff or defendants were asked to make an objective
assessment of the monetary judgment in the case: assessments of students designated as plaintiffs
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This bias allows them to overlook flaws in their own behavior or the envi-
ronment and believe that their acts are moral and good for all parties
involved. In the workplace, this bias allows workers to bury their heads in
the sand and ignore almost any misbehavior carried out by their colleagues
and managers, since confrontation always comes at a personal cost.
Finally, three additional pervasive cognitive biases are particularly rele-
vant: the status quo bias, the availability bias, and the anchorage bias. All
three are grave impediments to any employee-monitoring endeavor. The
status quo bias means that people tend to preserve the current state of af-
fairs;4 1 in the workplace, if that state warrants modification, employees will
barely notice or else will not seek to effect any change. The availability and
anchorage biases refer to the fact that available and accessible information
and events make lasting, over-rated impressions 44 and that people hang on to
information they receive even when no evidence supports its credibility.
45
Because workers are introduced to existing practices and facts by their su-
pervisors and peers, these two biases make it harder for employees to
criticize their colleagues and doubt their statements.
In the absence of incentive pay, these biases and human characteristics
work in concert against the possibility of peer monitoring. Employees' natu-
ral tendencies are to avoid conflict, accept the current state of affairs and
any weak explanation that may support it, and overlook problematic occur-
rences and behaviors. Stock-based compensation releases certain forces that
mitigate these problems. Any harmful acts that hurt the shareholders also
hurt the recipient employee. The employee can hardly remain indifferent to
such harm, for this is no longer a self-serving strategy. As norms of confor-
mity conflict with norms of self-protection, the employee becomes
embittered and, in some cases, will report or otherwise act against the perpe-
trators of harm to the firm.
F. Tax Considerations
Undeniably, tax considerations are critical to understanding the surge in
use of stock-based compensation, particularly stock-option plans. One such
consideration, in brief, is that tax deferrals are allowed for "nonqualified"
options, and both tax deferrals and improved tax rates for the employee are
were much higher than those designated as defendants, although both groups considered the same
case). See generally Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (discussing the operation of the
self-serving bias in groups).
43. E.g., William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (discussing human preference for the present state).
44. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 141-43 (2000) (discussing the
availability bias); Shelley E. Taylor, The availability bias in social perception and interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 190 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
(same).
45. Scott Pious, Thinking the Unthinkable: The Effects of Anchoring on Likelihood Estimates
of Nuclear War, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 67 (1989) (describing a famous experiment assessing
the risk of a nuclear war).
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available for "qualified" options. A second tax consideration, relevant only
for top management, is that, under section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue
Code, compensation beyond $1 million paid to executives named in the
company's proxy statement (usually the five highest-paid managers) cannot
be deducted as an expense for tax purposes. 4 But section 162(m) exempts
"performance-based" compensation from this burdensome limitation, mak-
ing options comparatively more attractive.
The inevitable conclusion of this brief discussion is that taxation consid-
erations are a major factor in the development and use of stock-based
compensation.4 ' But, for two chief reasons, this explanation does not render
the rest of the discussion redundant. The first reason is normative and the
second descriptive. First, as manifested in the section 162(m) exemption,
Congress intentionally drafted tax breaks to encourage "performance-based"
compensation. It is therefore important to question whether stock-based
compensation should be encouraged and, particularly, what incentives, if
any, this compensation method creates. Second, it is important to recognize
the huge waste involved in this type of compensation to understand that the
tax benefits offered, no matter how substantial, cannot be the sole reason for
the popularity of stock-based compensation.
Employees are typically risk-averse. The value of stock-based compensa-
tion-which, as will be discussed shortly, is a major component of employees'
remuneration-is highly contingent on risk factors and uncertainties that are
far beyond the control of the recipient employees. Risk-averse employees
therefore discount the value of stock-based compensation. Finns could substi-
tute this type of compensation with a much lower payment in cash that does
not entail uncertainty. The difference between the two alternatives is the cost,
or the waste, involved in stock-based compensation. Several leading econo-
mists have tried to quantify this cost, concluding that, operating under
reasonable assumptions about risk aversion and diversification, employees
46. For a short summary, see Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 53. In reality, most options
granted as part of an employee stock-option plan are nonqualified, due to certain restrictions that
attach to the qualified plans and the firm's inability to deduct a compensation expense for those
options. Id. The deduction of a compensation expense for nonqualified options is a major issue at
certain firms that enjoy a huge tax benefit from this non-cash expense. For instance:
Cisco received a tax benefit of nearly $2.5 billion dollars from the exercise of employees'
stock options. As a result, the company paid little (and possible no) federal income taxes while
reporting $2.67 billion in profits. Cisco obtained the tax benefits from a provision in the tax
code that allows firms an income tax deduction equal to the gain recognized by employees on
the exercise of their nonqualified options."
Michelle Hanlon & Terry J. Shevlin, Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock Options and
Implications for Research 1 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com-
abstractid=271310; see also David Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 695 (2004) (presenting a broad discussion of tax issues related to stock-based compensation, and
revealing that the tax advantage of such compensation is not obvious).
47. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000).
48. This conclusion does not account for all taxation effects on the employer. When all such
complex effects are taken into account, at least one scholar argues that, in practice, there is no ag-
gregate tax advantage to using stock option as compensation. Walker, supra note 46, at 701 ("So, is
equity compensation tax advantaged? In theory, yes. In practice, generally no.").
1437May 2007]
Michigan Law Review
value options (with ordinary features) at "only about half of their cost to the
firm. '49 This astounding gap cannot be overcome solely by any tax benefit,
rendering pertinent the inquiry in the next Part, into the motivational bene-
fits arising from stock-based compensation.
III. REVERSE MONITORING: A NEW VIEW OF ESOPs
AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM
A. On Two Versions ofAgency Theory Explanations
A recent article entitled Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No In-
centive Effects? exemplifies the puzzle of mid-level employee incentive
pay.0 As will be shown below, mid-level employees receive modest option
grants in comparison to executives and their efforts have negligible impact
on the firm's market value relative to efforts made by the CEO and a small
group of top executives. This reality has led researchers to argue that the
common agency-theory understanding of incentive pay does not hold in this
context, driving them to search for explanations beyond the scope of agency
theory.5 The principal point of this Article, however, is that agency theory
can in fact supply a good explanation for the prevalence of employee owner-
ship plans, although not the one usually advanced in the literature. To
elucidate the difference between the two arguments stemming from agency
theory, it is important to review briefly the fundamental features of the the-
52
ory.
Under agency theory, whenever one person, the agent (in our case, an
employee), is required to fulfill a task for another person, the principal (in
our case, the employer), a conflict of interest emerges. This conflict means
the agent may pursue her own agenda rather than actions optimal in fulfill-
ing her task for the principal. As a result, goes the argument, the principal-
agent setting entails three types of costs. The first type is monitoring costs.
Since the agent is prone to deviate from the goals set for her, the principal
must employ expensive means to verify what her agent is doing and, if nec-
essary, call her to order. Hence, business owners review the accounts to
49. Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 56; see also Hall & Murphy, supra note 11, at 211; Hall
& Murphy, supra note 14, at 12-13. Another study estimated that for every dollar worth of options,
the company actually wastes $0.64 to cover the risk premium for employees. Oyer & Schaefer,
supra note 15, at 16. Employees' risk aversion is also evident because they tend to exercise their
options before the expiration date. See J. Carr Bettis et al., The Cost of Employee Stock Options 3
(Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=376440
(finding that employees exercise options nearly five years prior to expiration and that employees in
high-volatility firms exercise their options more than a year and a half earlier compared to employ-
ees in firms with low volatility).
50. Oyer, supra note 5, at 1.
51. See, e.g., Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 54 ("Given the increasing prevalence of broad-
based plans, a compelling theory of employee stock options must explain not only executive stock
options, but also options granted to the rank and file.").
52. These basic features are outlined in the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling, who are
considered the founding fathers of agency theory. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
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prevent deviances; restaurant owners use covert inspectors to verify the level
of service; owners of diamond mines check the clothes of miners at the end
of the day to prevent theft. These types of efforts and expenses are termed
monitoring costs.
The second inevitable type of cost is bonding costs. Bonding measures
do not assist the principal in scrutinizing and governing the actions of the
agent, but, rather, are intended to ensure that the agent sticks to the objec-
tives of her employment. Hence, a public servant is often required to cut any
ties he may have with the business community to ensure objectivity; finan-
cial reporters or advisors are required to refrain from personal investments
to prevent skewed recommendations; and workers go to much trouble to
bring references and pursue studies, which, at least in part, are efforts aimed
at showing how devoted they are going to be to their jobs.
Finally, even after monitoring and bonding costs, there is a residual loss
to be borne. This means there is always enough room for a conflict of inter-
est to arise between the principal and agent. For example, a certain amount
of theft by workers always occurs; some confidential information will al-
ways leak; and employee effort levels rarely meet those of owners. In fact,
as long as the residual losses are lower than the cost of additional bonding
or monitoring costs required to overcome them, it is efficient to incur these
losses.
Into this normative setting enters the traditional account of incentive pay.
Since any worker is an agent and therefore presents risks of misbehavior,
theft, disgorgement of confidential information, and simple laziness, agency
theory calls upon the parties to design the employment agreement accord-
ingly. Specifically, under agency theory, compensation should be structured
to overcome these problems. If the employee can hope to receive a part of
the gains accrued by the employer from optimal service, then the agency
problem can be alleviated. In the traditional argument, linking pay to per-
formance of the employer's stock on the stock exchange by, for example,
granting options, may achieve this desired goal.
Option grants, however, are undeniably an expensive method of com-
pensation. The main reason is that employees, like most people, are risk-
averse. Since the value of option grants fluctuates due to factors beyond the
employee's control, options are an extremely risky asset from her perspec-
tive. Moreover, employees are tied, along with their human capital, to the
firm; putting much of their personal wealth in options means putting all
their eggs in one basket and further increasing their risk. Taken together, the
risk-bearing factor would cause employees to accept much lower compensa-
tion in cash over an option grant with equivalent market value. Therefore,
payment with options, which employees value less, is expensive currency
for firms.5 3 Furthermore, since no one can go to the grocery store with
53. The shareholders who suffer from dilution are those who bear the costs of the payment in
options. Since shareholders with diversified portfolios are risk-neutral, they will prefer that the firm
pay lower amounts in cash rather than issue additional shares whose worth exceeds those amounts.
Put differently, transferring a lottery ticket (i.e., options) from a risk-neutral person (i.e., the share-
holders) to a risk-averse person (i.e., the employee) entails much loss.
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options, they cannot replace the employee's entire salary. Thus options usu-
ally supplement-at least in part-regular salary, further increasing the cost
of options to the firm and its shareholders.54
The incentives that options create must overcome these costs to make
option grants worthwhile. Note, though, that under the traditional argument,
option grants are not intended to allow the principal to watch and govern the
agent's actions, and therefore they cannot be counted as monitoring costs.
On the contrary, their role is to induce employees to exert effort even when
the employer is not watching. To some extent, this argument even assumes
that employee efforts are non-verifiable from the point of view of the em-
ployer. In agency theory terms, therefore, the proper specification of the
costs that options entail is bonding costs. The employee accepts options,
even though she would prefer the equivalent in cash, in order to commit to
the objectives of the shareholders. The problem with this argument is that it
cannot stand up to any test of reality, at least in the context of the actual
compensation plans of most workers.
A recent study shows that a typical firm grants options with a value
equal to one year's salary to middle managers and that these managers own
"a very small fraction of the firm (less than one one-thousandth of a percent
in the case of the large firms). 5 Careful econometric analysis shows that
using options to motivate managers to exert efforts under these circum-
stances is ludicrous and, in the words of the authors, "[g]iven our
calculations here, we find it very difficult to believe that stock options could
be the most efficient incentive mechanism available to firms. 56 For example,
consider an engineer who receives an option grant of $100,000 in a firm
with a market value of $10 billion. To increase the value of her fractional
holdings by just 1% (equivalent to $1,000), she needs to increase the firm's
market value by $100 million. It is doubtful that any effort on her part could
achieve this goal, especially an effort valued at less than $1,000 from her
perspective. Recall also the waste related to risk-bearing on which we have
elaborated earlier in our discussion.17 Many risk-averse managers would be
willing to exchange nontransferable options worth $100,000 for half the
amount in cash.58 Under these circumstances, it seems unrealistic to surmise
that firms cannot devise a better mechanism to ensure optimal effort by their
employees.
While exerting efforts to perform better seems an ill-fitted rationale for
the use of stock options, the empirical research still finds a (remotely) plau-
sible incentive effect for options:
54. See Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 56 ("[I]ndeed, most broad-based option plans are
added on top of existing competitive pay packages.").
55. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 15, at 20-22.
56. Id. at 23.
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58. Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 55.
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[O]ptions are sensible for incentive purposes under a very limited set of
circumstances-namely, if employees take actions that have large value
implications for the firm, the costs to the employee of taking these actions
are very small, and it is extremely difficult for firms to observe whether
employees are taking these actions.59
This allegedly hypothetical and remote case for an incentive-based justi-
fication for options is precisely the case of reverse monitoring. One should
not think of options, especially those granted to mid-level employees, as a
method of encouraging recipient employees to work harder, but rather as an
incentive to watch other workers and constituencies of the entity. Put differ-
ently, the costs of options borne by the firm are monitoring costs, not
bonding costs. Armed with options, employees will ensure that others do not
harm the firm. Note that all three requirements of the empirical study are
fulfilled here. First, no special effort is needed beyond paying attention, as
employees are natural monitors of their peers. While outside agents need to
penetrate the organization and use surveillance techniques or indirect moni-
toring methods, the employees are already there, performing their day-to-
day tasks. The employer can arrange the work force and the work tasks to
enhance the ease of monitoring. For instance, working in groups and divid-
ing up one task among several groups to require interaction-the reality in
many high-tech firms-is one means of doing this. The physical structure of
the work environment is another method, as open space and any other spa-
tial arrangement that increases transparency allow for easy monitoring. In
many new economy firms, an employee cannot make a phone call or per-
form a task on her computer screen without other employees inadvertently
noticing. In these places, options are commonly believed to motivate em-
ployees to work harder because of the options they receive. It actually
makes more sense to believe they work harder because their peers have re-
ceived options and are watching them closely.
Second, while the efforts exerted by a single mid-level employee cannot
contribute much to improving the market value of a large firm, the employee
can still significantly harm the firm, especially in the knowledge industry. In
an interview with a mid-level manager at Intel, the manager explained that
each engineer in his group could easily harm Intel significantly by releasing
certain information to a competitor.W Intel, with its multi-billion-dollar mar-
ket value, is particularly vulnerable to such leaks due to the nature of its
assets. While one lone engineer cannot reasonably improve the market value
significantly, the potential damage that the individual worker can wreak to
this value is enormous. Investing in monitoring is, therefore, crucial, and the
more vulnerable a firm is, the more options it is likely to issue to its em-
ployees. It is hard to find an effective alternative to so many good and
intelligent monitors already positioned within the facility. Monitoring by
employees is thus both non-substitutable and likely to prevent much harm,
59. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 15, at 24.
60. Interview with one of Intel's mid-level managers, in Haifa, Isr. (Jan. 2, 2006).
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thereby fulfilling two additional requirements for effective use of options
laid out in the empirical literature.
B. Additional Empirical Verification
The findings of additional recent empirical studies of broad-based em-
ployee ownership plans seem to comply with the predictions of this Article's
theory and fail to conform to the classic incentive-based explanation. One
paper compares executive option grants to non-executive option plans, fol-
61lowing a sample of 1170 firms through 1996-2001 . Similar to the results
of previous studies, the authors of this study found that top-five executives
receive a disproportionate share of the total grants (20%) and that ESOPs
62tend to increase both the firm's valuation and net income. The study's un-
precedented finding was that, in the regressions, the non-executive portion
of the grant had a pronounced and positive effect on both net income and
firm valuation.63 Given this finding, the authors took for granted the tradi-
tional account of options as an incentive mechanism and made the following
statement: "On the surface it may seem surprising that the effect of options
appears to be smaller for executives than for lower-level employees since,
from a risk/incentive perspective, it seems likely that executives have more
control over firm performance and may be less risk averse."6
Thus, the authors implicitly view options as a way to compensate only
those who should be encouraged to exert additional costly effort, and they
therefore logically assume that broad-based plans entail waste. Because
lower-level employee efforts barely affect a firm's market value, the authors
were surprised to find that broad-based plans increase firm performance and
market value more than executive-only plans. 65 Under the reverse monitor-
ing argument, however, even the slightest incentives can suffice to induce
one employee to monitor her peers, since no extraordinary efforts are neces-
sary on her part to do so. This is especially true in firms and industries in
which a lack of careful monitoring at all levels of the organization can
lead to much damage. These firms reveal themselves as such by adopting
broad-based ESOPs, and it therefore comes as no surprise that these
measures increase their performance and valuation.66 Most significantly,
61. Wayne R. Landsman et al., Governance and the Split of Options between Executive and
Non-executive Employees 1, 15 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=688083.
62. Id. at 6-7, 16.
63. Id. at 16-20.
64. Id. at 6.
65. This surprising conclusion led the authors to search for a different answer, and they
eventually argued that weak corporate governance harms the positive outcomes of executive stock
option plans. Id. at 7 ("[Iln the absence of strong governance, executive options have little or nega-
tive consequences for valuation and future profitability.").
66. IP intensive firms may not be aware of this argument but still enjoy its benefit. It is pos-
sible they observe its benefits but wrongly assume that they stem from the classic incentive
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the ancillary findings of this empirical paper support the notion and entire
reasoning of the reverse monitoring argument. These findings, which the
authors did not think particularly important, are summarized in the paper as
follows: "[a] larger proportion of options tend to go to lower-level employ-
ees for firms that are larger, have more employees, spend more on research
and development and have higher market-to-book ratios. 67
All four features in this finding conform to the predictions of the reverse
monitoring argument. First, larger firms and firms with more employees not
only issue more options to low-level employees, but do so in higher propor-
tions than other firms relative to their size and employee base. Under the
traditional incentive-based explanation of options, this finding would be
puzzling. Larger firm size makes it harder for the individual employee to
improve firm value through her efforts; a sizable workforce at a firm creates
free-riding in the sense that one employee's inexertion of effort can be easily
overcome by the efforts of others, while exertion of effort by one employee
is diluted by the acts of her many peers. It is precisely these two characteris-
tics, however, that make monitoring employees in such firms by
management difficult. Hence, management must expend more resources on
monitoring by peer employees, which is the result of a high proportion of
stock grants to non-executives. It is harder for options to cause employees to
exert additional effort in larger firms and firms with a larger workforce;
thus, it is much more important to motivate these workers to watch one an-
other. And since options can barely serve to motivate directly a mid-level
employee to increase her effort level, the latter monitoring effect is crucial.
Second, options to lower-level employees are more common in firms
with higher market-to-book ratios. Firms with high market-to-book ratios
are often those firms with high levels of intellectual property, since intellec-
tual property developed within the firm's boundaries does not appear in the
financial statement (and, hence, has no effect on the firm's "book" value).
And since intellectual property is especially vulnerable to leakage and tam-
pering, its existence poses a risk of an adverse material effect on the firm's
market value. Consequently, using options to induce peer monitoring is es-
pecially suited to protect the market value of the firm that holds much of this
property.
Finally, and related to the previous point, firms that spend more on re-
search and development issue a larger proportion of their option plans to
lower-level employees. According to conventional wisdom, this finding
makes sense because workers in such firms are believed to be highly crea-
tive and significant to firm value. However, at the individual level, this
argument is questionable, as one worker's efforts, creative as they may be,
can hardly make much of a difference, at least in most cases, most of the
time. Nevertheless, firms with high R&D levels are usually new economy
explanations. I also assume most firms simply mimic other firms that experimented with ESOPs and
found them worthwhile.
67. Landsman et al., supra note 61, at 17.
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firms-firms in the knowledge industries. Such knowledge can be well pro-
tected by peer employees encouraged to monitor through option grants.
A second recent empirical study provides additional reinforcement of
the reverse monitoring view and explicitly contradicts the traditional incen-
tive-based argument. The authors set forth the mission of their paper as
follows:
There is, however, a small but growing body of empirical literature that
provides evidence that firms that broadly disperse stock options have
greater performance .... Do certain contextual factors (e.g. firm size, in-
dustry, technology) influence the relationship between broad-based stock
options and performance? In this paper, we focus on one such contextual
factor, firm size. We chose firm size because according to existing theory,
group incentives such as stock options are expected to be effective at moni-
toring employees only in smallfirms.... .s
This entire mission is, of course, rooted in the traditional understanding
of options as providing incentives to work harder and the view of the recipi-
ent employee as the entity that is bonded thereby. The authors explain the
expected negative relationship between size and firm efficacy on two levels:
First, as explained above, the larger the firm, the less influential each em-
ployee is on the firm's total output, and therefore it is less feasible to
motivate her with options that rely on total output. 69 Second, and more inter-
esting, greater firm size makes it harder to motivate employees even under a
much richer perception of the firm.' Since interaction between employees is
recurrent, they may cooperate with one another and refrain from free-riding.
This achieves an optimal outcome for everyone, even if each employee's
compensation is keyed to the total output.7' This argument is often used in
the context of group incentives and profit-sharing because the harder every-
one works, the greater the profits are to be shared for the benefit of
everyone. However, even with this deeper perception of the firm and incen-
tive structure, large firm size is likely to be a hindrance to option efficacy.
The larger the firm, the harder it is for cooperation to emerge, thereby en-
dangering the joint commitment to work harder in order to maximize total
output and, in turn, each worker's compensation.
Given these two effects of size, the authors expected to find that the
benefits of options to the issuing firm would decline with firm size (less
than 500 workers, between 500-5000 workers, and over 5000 workers). 2
They therefore gathered data on 312 firms that had adopted broad-based
option plans, divided them into three groups based on size, and matched up
68. James C. Sesil & Maya K. Kroumova, The Impact of Broad-Based Stock Options on
Firm Performance: Does Firm Size Matter? 3 (May 6, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=717081 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 5.
70. Id. at 14.
71. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (discussing the
emergence of cooperation in reiterated prisoner dilemmas).
72. Sesil & Kroumova, supra note 68, at 3.
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each size-group with a corresponding sample of non-adopting firms. 73 The
study followed the firms throughout the years 1995-1997, measuring multi-
ple aspects of firm performance (profit margins, shareholder return, labor
productivity, and return on assets). 4 This study covered over 1.1 million
employees who received options," out of about 8 to 10 million ESOP re-
cipients in the entire U.S. economy.1
6
The authors were surprised to find that option-adopting firms outper-
formed their non-adopting peers in each size category, not only in the small
size category." Moreover, when they compared among adopting firms, the
larger firms were found to outperform the smaller ones.78 These unantici-
pated findings led the authors to conclude, "we find strong evidence that
stock option firms perform better than non-stock option firms, however, we
do not find strong evidence that small stock option firms perform better than
stock option large firms."79 They consequently called for more research on
the topic. 0
Once again, from the perspective of the reverse monitoring explanation,
these findings come as no surprise. A large workforce sometimes prevents
efficient monitoring by means of the traditional employment hierarchy.
Granting options to many employees will cause them to monitor one an-
other, a task they can easily perform. If employees work any harder in these
circumstances, it is not because their options have motivated them to do so,
but, rather, because their peers are watching closely. Moreover, firm size by
number of employees often reflects firm maturity. A seasoned firm, with
seasoned technology, may need to use options to protect this technology. If
technology is both a vulnerable and a critical asset for the organization, op-
tion recipients will be alert in protecting against third-party infringement.
IV. INITIAL INQUIRY INTO ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF
THE REVERSE MONITORING THEORY
Until this point, this Article has discussed the concept of reverse moni-
toring in the context of broad-based stock ownership plans and shed light on
the puzzles that surround it. The reverse monitoring view of stock-based
73. Id. at 6-7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 3 (citing Press Release, National Center for Employee Ownership, A growing
number of U.S. employees receive stock options (Feb. 2002) (on file with author)).
77. Id. at 9 ("The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show that, within each size cate-
gory, broad-based stock option companies have higher average productivity, return on assets (ROA),
profit margin, and capital intensity compared to non-stock option companies.").
78. Id. ("Comparing small to large stock option companies using the simple means reported
in Table 2 shows they had similar [labor] productivity levels, but small firms appear to lag behind
large ones with respect to ROA and profit margins.").
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id. at 15.
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compensation concentrates on the role of the recipient of incentive pay as a
monitor of other firm employees, including the recipient's supervisors, in
contrast to the traditional view of the recipient as the entity that is bonded
by the stock grant. This concept has many more applications than can be
explored here at length, and they deserve further discussion and analysis.
For one, reverse monitoring can explain the rise in stock-based compensa-
tion for executives in firms located outside of the U.S., which typically have
concentrated ownership." The common story of stock-based compensation
for executives of U.S. firms explains that U.S firms often have dispersed
82
ownership. The dispersed shareholders cannot effectively monitor their
managers, and thus the monitoring gap is filled by stock options and the
like, which align manager and shareholder incentives."
This story, however, does not fit most economies outside the United
States, where public firms have concentrated ownership and, accordingly,
usually a controlling shareholder.84 A controlling shareholder, unlike dis-
persed shareholders, has both the incentives and the means to monitor and
discipline managers. Why then, is stock-based compensation, a costly
mechanism, also so common today in such firms? The reverse monitoring
concept suggests that executive stock compensation in these firms is meant
to induce managers to monitor their supervisors. Equipped with options,
these officers stand on guard against any misbehavior on the part of their
own monitor, the controlling shareholder of the entity. A controlling share-
holder sometimes has a perverse incentive to pursue her own goals at the
81. See, e.g., Michael H. Bradley & Anant K. Sundaram, The Emergence of Shareholder
Value in the German Corporation 16 (EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings, Paper No. 1467, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=463840 (reporting that no large German firm included
in the DAX 30 index had an ESOP in 1990, twenty-seven percent of the large German firms had
adopted ESOPs by 1995, and no less than seventy-three percent of these firms had ESOPs by 1999).
82. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511-
12 (1999) (reporting that U.S. firms, in contrast to firms in most world economies, have a dispersed
ownership structure); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 769 (1997) (noting that large investors are less common in U.S. firms than in most of the
world).
83. Note, however, that this explanation suffers from certain flaws even for dispersed owner-
ship firms. Any senior executive, aside from the CEO, has at least one boss. This boss can monitor
the performance of her supervisee and reward her accordingly. The bosses' monitoring and effective
promise of reward may be imperfect, but the crude nature and waste involved in stock-based com-
pensation cast much doubt on the value of using the latter method solely to replace or back the
monitoring role performed by the boss. This discussion, relating to the voluminous literature of U.S.
executive pay, falls beyond the scope of this Article. It deserves special attention as some of the
reform suggestions raised by commentators, such as the proposal to index options, do not necessar-
ily fit the reverse monitoring role highlighted by this Article. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 16, at 190 (concentrating on strengthening the link between executive bonus plans and im-
proved firm performance).
84. The literature views stock-based compensation as a method designed to alleviate the
agency problem between managers and shareholders and does not consider its role in concentrated
ownership firms. See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOmiCs 371 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2004) (analyzing differ-
ent types of agency costs and then describing stock-based compensation as a measure intended to
alleviate the so-called "horizontal" agency problem existing between executives and dispersed
shareholders).
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expense of the minority, most significantly in the context of self-dealing
transactions, which are not always beneficial to the firm.85 This can result in
a drop in the firm's share prices and harm to executives with substantial
stock holdings. Those executives possess the knowledge as to whether a
specific self-dealing transaction is good or bad for the firm and their direct
contact with independent directors and institutional shareholders may allow
86them to covertly block exploitative transactions . In turn, when institutional
investors examine self-dealing transactions in firms with stock-based com-
pensation, investors should be easily persuaded by the controlling
shareholder that she is not pursuing her own agenda, rather than the com-
mon interests of all shareholders. This means that controlling shareholders
can commit to act for the firm by granting stock-based compensation to
their executives. To conclude, in this setting, reverse monitoring explains
that executive stock compensation can work to alleviate the agency problem
between the controlling shareholder and the minority, and not only between
management and a dispersed shareholders body.
Another important application of the reverse monitoring approach
comes into play in the area of gatekeepers, such as outside directors, in-
vestment bankers, or outside legal counsels8 7 A recent paper, concentrating
on the role of outside directors as gatekeepers, suggests rewarding gate-
keepers with cash grants when they expose corporate misbehavior and in
88particular accounting fraud. The authors of the paper reject the idea of eq-
uity compensation to gatekeepers since, in cases of accounting fraud, stock-
based compensation can actually cause them to turn a blind eye to the fraud
that drives share prices up. Moreover, in endgame scenarios, as in the Enron
case, stock-based compensation does not provide any incentive, since in
bankruptcy stock compensation is generally worth nothing.88 While these
concerns carry great weight, they do not justify ruling out stock-based com-
pensation for gatekeepers. First, there are instances of corporate misconduct,
such as self-dealing by management, that, unlike accounting fraud, do not
inflate the value of the firm's stock and therefore do not create any perverse
incentives for the gatekeeper compensated with stock. Second, if stock-
based compensation is designed properly-namely, with a sufficiently long
horizon and a disgorgement of past profits that are based on fraud from the
85. Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AMER. EcON. REv. 22, 22 (2000) (describing self-
dealing as the gravest corporate governance problem outside the United States).
86. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2 (2005) (discussing the
role of both outside directors and informed minority shareholders in blocking unfair going-private
transactions, which are a certain type of self-dealing transactions that can be extremely detrimental
to the firm); Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11883, 2005), available at http://nber.org/papers/fW11883 (comparing
the different mechanisms used around the world to block harmful self-dealing transactions).
87. See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strat-
egy, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1983) (defining "gatekeepers" as private parties who are able to
disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers).
88. Hamdani & Kraakman, supra note 6 (considering the use of rewards to motivate outside
directors' diligence).
89. Id. at 17-23.
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gatekeepers' stock-based compensation -gatekeepers will have incentive
to fight accounting fraud as well (even in endgame scenarios), because it
never enhances the value of the firm in the long run. These two adjustments
to gatekeepers' stock-based compensation may overcome the concerns
raised in the literature and preserve the advantage of stock-based compensa-
tion over cash grants. This advantage lies in the fact that stock compensation
is automatic and fine-tuned. Armed with stock compensation, the gatekeeper
does not have to come forward and prove her case, as she would have to in
the case of a cash prize, and every cent that she saves for public sharehold-
ers is immediately reflected in the value of her compensation.
Last, but not least, reverse monitoring can explain why employee stock
option plans are common in pre-IPO ventures and at partially privatized
firms. With regard to pre-IPO ventures,9' stock options to employees prom-
ise pre-IPO financial investors (such as venture capitalists and angel
investors) that the firm's workforce will place pressure on the founders and
entrepreneurs heading the firm to go public as early as possible. Since ven-
ture capitalists and other private equity investors hope for a fast exit, large
option grants to many employees serve as a credible commitment from the
management of the venture not to waste the invested funds and to do all that
is possible to go public quickly. Any other behavior would be implausible
when the entire firm's workforce is vigilantly watching in the hope of cash-
ing in on the stock component of their pay. Indeed, one entrepreneur
described this feeling as "sitting on a volcano. 92 As for partially privatized
corporations, the reverse monitoring view serves to explain how stock com-
pensation can overcome a pervasive problem that plagues these firms. The
literature explains that government-owned enterprises underperform in the
market as management often concentrates on political goals to please the
owner.93 Hefty stock compensation to the executives and employees of such
90. The concept of disgorgement of past compensation, including profits from realization of
stock options, is already present in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation with regard to executive pay.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 304(a)(I)-(2) (codified in 15
U.S.C. 7243 (Supp. mI 2003)). Recent court decisions developed a similar approach based on the
unjust enrichment doctrine. See Scrushy v. Tucker, No. 1050564, 2006 Ala. LEXIS 230 (Aug. 25,
2006) (requiring HealthSouth's CEO to repay an amount of $47,828,106, representing the bonuses
paid for the years 1997-2002, that were based on materially misstated earnings); In re HealthSouth
Corp. S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff'd, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004) (rescinding
a transaction wherein HealthSouth's CEO repaid a $25 million loan to HealthSouth with shares of
his HealthSouth stock artificially inflated by an accounting fraud that raged on his watch as CEO,
although the CEO was not personally liable for the fraud).
91. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Start-
ups, 81 N.YU. L. REV. 967 (2006) (describing the prevalence of the practice of issuing stock
options at pre-IPO ventures).
92. Interview with an entrepreneur whose firm was financed by a venture capital fund and
has a workforce saturated with stock-options that expects to go public soon, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (Jan. 5,
2006).
93. See Nicholas Baberis et al., How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian
Shops, 104 J. POL. EcON. 764, 765 (1996) ("Managers of state firms are selected for their ability to
get along with politicians, address political concerns, and lobby for assistance. In contrast, manag-
ers of private firms are selected for their ability to run them efficiently.") (emphasis added); Andrei
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corporations promises to mitigate this problem and cause management to
stand on guard against self-interested interference from above.
CONCLUSION
Empirical data show that options cause firms to flourish. Intuition tells
us that they motivate employees to work harder in order to improve firm
value and, in turn, the value of their grants. But if this argument does not
hold-because the average correlation between individual employee effort
and total firm value is slim-then a substitute intuition is that employees
with options work harder because they "feel" like owners and therefore care
more about the firm. This Article suggests an alternative view, where op-
tions are more of a stick than a carrot. Undoubtedly options cause
employees to exert additional effort themselves and to cooperate. I claim
this comes from options driving individual employees to care about the acts
and whereabouts of their peers. While substantial additional efforts cannot
be motivated by slim financial incentives, monitoring others merely requires
awareness and attention. As I have shown in this Article, this new under-
standing can shed light on recent empirical findings and provide
explanations to puzzles such as the extensive use of options in new economy
firms.9
Because the tiny fraction of ownership the average employee receives
does not turn gigantic firms into Greek democracies or mutual-aid societies,
I also question the psychological explanation of options as fostering a sense
of ownership in employees. Options are monetary compensation; they are
not flowers or gifts for the holidays that employers distribute to show that
they care and to raise morale.9 It is therefore important to analyze carefully
why options bring about effective results as a monetary incentive. People in
close-knit communities, such as family units, cooperate with one another
due to a sense of belonging and genuine and sincere caring; it is doubtful
that financial incentives cultivate such altruistic behavior. I therefore argue
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q. J. ECON. 995, 1023 (1994) (discussing
the harmful effect of politicians' control on firms).
94. Not all puzzles were discussed. For instance, the reverse monitoring argument may also
explain the shift from stock-options to restricted stock, following the changes in accounting stan-
dards that eliminated the advantage of using stock-options. See supra Section H.D. Stock-options
seem a better fit from the perspective of the classic increased-efforts view of options. Since options
promise rewards only for improved firm performance, an employee unable to contribute to achiev-
ing such targets will not receive any benefit. Compensation in shares seems more appropriate to
support a monitoring task, in which preventing a downside is at least as important as promising an
upside. Once the artificial accounting benefit of stock options was eliminated, it was no wonder
firms opted for shares in lieu of options more often.
95. Some scholars take this argument further and claim that stock options and similar incen-
tive compensation schemes actually harm employees' willingness to exert efforts for the firm. Dirk
Sliwka, Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes (For-
schungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit [Inst. for the Study of Labor] Discussion Paper Series, IZA
DP No. 2293, 2006) available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=932028 (arguing that high-powered
incentives may crowd out motivation as they convey the pessimism of the employer in regards to the
norms and ethics of her employees, and that by choosing fixed wages the principal signals trust in a
favorable social norm).
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that options promote cooperation and industriousness because there is no
way to get away with exerting less-than-maximum effort when your peers
are watching and considering the effects of your behavior on their compen-
sation. Accordingly, any misconduct may result in informal sanctions,
singling out, and, in some cases, even reporting to supervisors. Moreover,
arranging the workplace in a way that allows for transparency of employee
efforts-so prevalent in many of the firms that use options-is not aimed at
generating a friendly work atmosphere for employees. Rather, these typical
spatial arrangements are aimed at reinforcing peer monitoring and thus sup-
plementing the use of options.
In this short Article, I have reviewed the growing body of empirical lit-
erature on broad-based ESOPs and shown that the reverse monitoring theory
fits comfortably with the empirical findings. Moreover, the reverse monitor-
ing theory sheds light on several pervasive puzzles raised by the empirical
and theoretical literature. Additional verification of the reverse monitoring
theory would require an independent study. While I do not intend to propose
a methodical research agenda, several doable tests come to mind. One line
of research can aim to expose the additional monitoring benefits of peer
monitoring in firms that use ESOPs. One possible hypothesis in this connec-
tion would be that ESOP firms should have more selective layoffs than
similar non-ESOP firms. Another line of research could try to track com-
plementary arrangements for peer monitoring in ESOP firms. For instance,
ESOP firms might have policies or structured procedures in which one em-
ployee can easily and confidentially convey her opinion of her peers, such as
through periodical questionnaires. As a third line of research, one could try
to find a link between ESOP usage and IP protection. For instance, the re-
verse monitoring theory would predict a correlation between R&D
expenditure and ESOP grants to personnel not directly involved in the crea-
tion of the R&D. Because these personnel do not require powerful
incentives to perform research, it is possible they are actually being moti-
vated to prevent IP leakage. Finally, one could survey employees in ESOP
versus non-ESOP firms and try to measure or ask the staff about peer pres-
sure.
Before concluding, it is important to explain that this theory does not re-
quire employers to be fully aware of the theory's consequences and
operation. CEOs do not necessarily devise ESOPs with the intention of
causing their employees to spy on one another. CEOs do, however, find out,
either by hunch or by observation, that options stimulate labor to work
harder and perform better. CEOs then choose to tell themselves and their
subordinates a pleasant story, in which options cause workers to exert addi-
tional effort since they wish to improve firm value--or, alternatively, that
options simply motivate employees since employees are proud to be part of
an entity that regards them as owners. The perhaps more convincing story,
the one in which employees work harder because options turn their friends
into monitors, is less convenient and therefore silenced or never realized.
Finally, this Article discussed the concept of reverse monitoring in the
context of broad-based stock ownership plans and shed light on the puzzles
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that surround it. Most of the existing literature about employee stock owner-
ship plans concentrates on executive compensation. The dramatic rise in use
of these plans for managers raised managerial remuneration to frightening
new heights. Between the years 1980 and 1994, the average executive's
compensation rose by 209%,96 and between the years 1992 and 1998, it al-
most tripled, with average compensation to the top five executives in the
largest 500 U.S. companies climbing from $2,335,000 to $6,549,000.9' The
increase in average CEO total compensation was even more stunning, from
$3,500,000 in 1992 to $14,700,000 in 2000.9'
This surge brought about much academic discussion in which one group
of scholars criticizes the current structure of executive incentive pay,99 while
the other tries to justify it. However, a full theory of ESOPs must account
for all types of ESOPs, and not only those offered to top executives, and the
lack of such account should be considered as a warning sign for the accu-
racy of the existing theories of executive pay. If one cannot explain ESOP
grants to mid- and low-level managers and ordinary employees, how can
one be sure one's explanation about top managers is complete? The reverse
monitoring theory presented in this Article as an explanation for broad-
based ESOPs may actually support the existing theories about executive
ESOPs. Any senior executive (aside from the CEO) has at least one full-time
boss. This boss can monitor the performance of her supervisee and reward
her accordingly. While this mechanism is imperfect, it is doubtful if the cost
of stock options can be justified merely by the need to improve this mecha-
nism. The idea of reverse and peer monitoring must be taken into account as
well. Armed with stock options, key officers do not only exert more efforts
but also watch one another, including their CEO. This added value may ex-
plain why executive ESOPS are worthwhile, even if one believes that the
existing explanations cannot justify the existing practices in the market-
place.
96. Hall & Liebman, supra note 8, at 655.
97. Murphy, supra note 12, at 847-48 (discussing growth in executive compensation); see
also Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred For C: The Widening Gap in Pay
Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115 (2003) (discuss-
ing and criticizing growth in executive compensation).
98. Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 51 (reporting and discussing executive compensation
and option grants).
99. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003) (describing flaws in the design of managers' pay and
their consequences).
100. E.g., Core et al., supra note 16, at 1142.
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